How Do Retirees Value Life Annuities? Evidence from Public Employees by John Chalmers & Jonathan Reuter
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We thank Pierluigi Balduzzi, Daniel Bergstresser, Jeffrey Brown (discussant), John Campbell, David
Chapman, Daniel Cooper, Cliff Holderness, Edie Hotchkiss, Alexander Ljungqvist (editor), Alan Marcus,
Robin McKnight, Bertrand Melenberg, Ali Ozdagli, Joshua Rauh, Antoinette Schoar, Phil Strahan,
Peter Tufano, Eric Zitzewitz, an anonymous referee, and participants at the 2010 Netspar Pension
Workshop, 2010 Boston Area Consumer Finance Working Group, and 2011 American Finance Association
Meetings in Denver for helpful discussions related to this project.  We thank Benjamin Goodman for
providing data on how TIAA priced life annuities over our sample period, and we thank employees
from the Oregon Public Employees Retirement System who provided invaluable assistance by compiling
and helping us to interpret their data.  Because PERS was subject to major legislative changes in late
2003, our description of the system only applies to the period for which we possess data.  This research
was supported by the U.S. Social Security Administration through grant #10-M-98363-1-01 to the
National Bureau of Economic Research as part of the SSA Retirement Research Consortium.  The
findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of
SSA, any agency of the Federal Government, or the NBER.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by John Chalmers and Jonathan Reuter. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.How Do Retirees Value Life Annuities? Evidence from Public Employees
John Chalmers and Jonathan Reuter
NBER Working Paper No. 15608
December 2009, Revised February 2012
JEL No. D14,G11,G22,H55
ABSTRACT
Economists have long been puzzled by the low demand for life annuities.  To shed new light on this
puzzle, we study payout choices in the Oregon Public Employees Retirement System, where each
retiree must choose between a lump sum and a life annuity.  Notably, the average life annuity we study
is better than actuarially fair when compared to the lump sum and 85% of retirees choose the life annuity.
Whether and how retirees respond to variation in the value of life annuity payments depends crucially
on the source of variation.  We find strong evidence that demand responds to variation in retiree characteristics.
In contrast, we find little evidence that demand responds to plausibly exogenous variation in annuity
pricing, which is economically meaningful but less salient.  Finally, we find robust evidence that demand
for the lump sum increases with recent equity market returns and other salient measures of investor
sentiment.
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1.  Introduction 
Ever since Yaari’s (1965) seminal paper, economists have argued that retirees should al-
locate a substantial portion of their assets to life annuities.  Because life annuities continue mak-
ing payments until death, they insure retirees against outliving their accumulated financial assets.  
In a standard life-cycle model, this insurance is quite valuable.  It is puzzling, therefore, that the 
private market for life annuities is small.
1  The traditional explanation for this inconsistency be-
tween economic models and economic behavior is that adverse selection drives up annuity pric-
es, which drives down demand.  This presupposes that retirees are rationally comparing the price 
of a life annuity to the expected benefit of smoother lifetime consumption.
2  Alternatively, as de-
lineated in Brown (2009) and Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler (2011), the dearth of annuitization 
may reflect poor financial decision-making, resulting from financial illiteracy or behavioral bias-
es.  Distinguishing between rational and behavioral explanations for “under annuitization” is im-
portant because their welfare and policy implications are quite different. 
  Life-cycle models predict that demand for life annuities will be higher when the life an-
nuity payments available to retirees are more valuable.  Variation in the value of these payments 
can arise from differences in retiree characteristics or from differences in life annuity pricing.  
However, due to the lack of plausibly exogenous variation in life annuity pricing, the existing 
literature focuses on variation in retiree characteristics (e.g., Brown (2001), Finkelstein and 
Poterba (2004), Bütler and Teppa (2007), Previtero (2010), and Inkmann, Lopes, and 
Michaelides (2011)).  While informative, these papers offer an incomplete picture of retiree be-
                                                 
1 According to Beacon Research, life annuity sales (outside of employer-sponsored retirement plans) were $8 billion 
in 2010, which is small relative to annual sales of other financial products, such as mutual funds. 
2 Even when Yogo (2009) extends existing life-cycle models to include endogenous investments in health, he finds 
that the expected utility gains from access to life annuities vary from 13% to 18%, with smaller gains for retirees in 
poorer health.  Although these gains are approximately half those estimated in Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and 
Brown (1999), they are economically significant.   2
havior.  The fact that demand for life annuities responds to variation in retiree health, for exam-
ple, need not imply that it responds to variation in life annuity pricing, which may not be salient 
even when economically significant. 
  To offer a fuller picture of how retirees value life annuities, we study the actual payout 
decisions of retirees covered by the Oregon Public Employees Retirement System (PERS).
3  Our 
sample includes 32,060 retirements between January 1990 and June 2002.  It has two notable 
features.  First, each retiree must choose whether to receive higher life annuity payments and no 
lump sum payment (the “total life annuity” option) or lower life annuity payments and a lump 
sum payment (the “lump sum” option).  The choice between additional life annuity payments 
and cash is analogous to the choice that retirees face in the private market.  Second, our empiri-
cal setting provides us with a unique opportunity to study the impact of plausibly exogenous var-
iation in life annuity pricing on retiree demand for life annuities. 
Variation in life annuity pricing arises from the unusual way in which PERS calculates 
retirement benefits.  Employees contribute a fixed percentage of their salary into an account with 
two investment options.  Under the lump sum option, retirees are offered their accumulated re-
tirement account balance as the lump sum payment.  Under the total life annuity and lump sum 
options, life annuity payments are calculated using as many as three formulae, and retirees are 
automatically offered the maximum payments for which they are eligible.  For some retirees, the 
maximum payment is based on the retiree’s years of service and salary history.  For other retir-
ees, the maximum payment is obtained when the retirement account balance is multiplied by a 
conversion factor, referred to as the actuarial equivalency factor, which depends only on the re-
tiree’s age.  While the conversion factors used in the private market offer retirees a risk-free rate 
                                                 
3 PERS is the state agency that administers retirement plans for approximately 95% of the state and local public em-
ployees in Oregon.  Our data exclude judges, politicians, or university employees.  In 2009, PERS held nearly $53 
billion in assets, making it the 21st largest public or private pension fund in the United States.   3
of return based on the yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury Note, the conversion factors used by 
PERS offer retirees a risk-free rate of return of approximately 10 percent regardless of current 
market conditions.
4 
  These features cause the pricing of PERS life annuities to deviate in three significant 
ways from the pricing of life annuities in the private market.  First, PERS life annuity payments 
are significantly larger than those that could be purchased with the lump sum in the private mar-
ket.  This reflects that fact that the yield on the 10-year Treasury Note is below 10 percent during 
our entire sample period.  For the median retiree, the total life annuity option has a “money’s 
worth” of $1.45, meaning that the incremental life annuity payments have an expected present 
value of $1.45 per $1.00 in forgone lump sum payment.  By way of comparison, Mitchell, 
Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999) show that the money’s worth of life annuities offered 
by life insurance companies are between $0.80 and $0.90.  Second, the fact that different retir-
ees’ maximum life annuity payments are calculated using different formulae generates cross-
sectional variation in the value of PERS life annuity payments.  Consider a retiree whose maxi-
mum life annuity payment is based on her years of service and salary.  Because she is also eligi-
ble for life annuity payments offering a 10 percent rate of return, the payments based on her 
years of service and salary history must offer an even higher rate of return.  This is one example 
of how retiree characteristics that would not impact the level of life annuity payments in the pri-
vate market can impact the level of PERS life annuity payments.  Another example is that retir-
ees who first contributed into PERS after August 1981 are eligible to have their (maximum) total 
life annuity payments calculated using one fewer formulae than retirees who contributed into 
PERS before that date.  Finally, because PERS conversion factors are not adjusted to reflect 
                                                 
4 The PERS conversion factors are used to determine the initial life annuity payment.  Because they were set well 
before our sample period begins, when interest rates were routinely near 8 percent, they assume that the risk-free 
rate of return is 8 percent.  Because of the cost of living adjustment, payments then increase by 2 percent per year.   4
market conditions, time-series variation in the risk-free rate generates time-series variation in the 
value of the PERS life annuities relative to those in the private market.  Everything else equal, 
the lower is the yield on the 10-year Treasury Note, the more valuable is the total life annuity 
option. 
  If retirees understand that PERS life annuities are better than actuarially fair, we should 
observe lower demand for lump sum payments in our setting than in other settings.  Indeed, only 
15% of PERS retirees choose the lump sum option.  This fraction is significantly lower than one 
might surmise from a reading of the literature on the under-annuitization puzzle.  It is all the 
more striking given that there is no default payout option, and that Oregon public employees are 
eligible to receive life annuity payments from Social Security.
5  One interpretation for our find-
ing is that the average retiree recognizes that PERS life annuities are a “good deal.”  However, 
this begs the question of whether retirees respond to variation in the generosity of the life annui-
ties available from PERS. 
  The fraction of retirees choosing the lump sum option ranges from 6.9% in 1992 to 
21.7% in 2000.  To explain variation in retiree choices we estimate both time-series regressions 
using the fraction of retirees choosing the lump sum option each month and logit regressions us-
ing individuals’ choices.  The logit regressions allow us to exploit the cross-sectional and time-
series variation in the value of life annuity payments described above.  They also allow us to 
control for differences in retiree characteristics, which we conjecture are the most salient source 
of variation.  For example, not only should a life annuity be less valuable to a (single) retiree in 
poor health, but also the impact of poor health on the value of the life annuity should be easily 
                                                 
5 Because Madrian and Shea (2001) show that default options can have a dramatic impact on financial choices, it is 
fortuitous that PERS retirees are not assigned to either payout option by default.  Retirees must actively choose. We 
should only observe a retiree choosing the total life annuity option when the value she attaches to the incremental 
life annuity payments exceeds the value she attaches to the lump sum payment.     5
understood.  Indeed, we find strong evidence that retirees understand how differences in health, 
risk aversion, and the level of already-annuitized income impact the value of the incremental life 
annuity income.  These findings are consistent with the predictions of life-cycle models, and with 
Brown (2001), Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), and Inkmann, Lopes, and Michaelides (2011).   
  In contrast, when we focus on plausibly exogenous variation in life annuity pricing, our 
findings are difficult to reconcile with the predictions of life-cycle models.  Although we observe 
significant cross-sectional variation in the value of life annuity payments due to the use of multi-
ple benefit formulae, the evidence that retirees respond to this variation is weak.  This suggests 
that cross-sectional variation in annuity pricing is not salient.  And, although demand for the 
lump sum option should decrease when the gap between the life annuity payments available from 
PERS and insurance companies like TIAA increases, we find the opposite.  One explanation for 
this puzzling relation is that retirees are confused about the role that interest rates play in life an-
nuity valuation, which is consistent with the evidence in, for example, Campbell (2006) and 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) that financial illiteracy leads to financial mistakes. 
  An alternative explanation is that falling interest rates are correlated with declining eco-
nomic conditions, which increase the relative value of the lump sum payment.  Similarly, be-
cause our sample period includes the NASDAQ bubble, changes in interest rates may be corre-
lated with changes in investor sentiment.  To address concerns about potential omitted variables 
bias we include proxies for economic conditions and investor sentiment that include the return on 
the S&P 500 index over the prior 12 months, the inflation-adjusted level of the NASDAQ index, 
and the level of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX).  While including these controls reduces the 
size of the puzzling relation, we still do not find any evidence that lower interest rates decrease 
demand for the lump sum option.  Instead, we find robust evidence that demand for the lump   6
sum option is higher when equity market returns are higher, even after directly controlling for 
returns posted to retirees’ PERS retirement accounts.  Although we do not observe if retirees in-
vest the lump sum payment in risky assets, this finding is consistent with retirees using the lump 
sum to naively chase past returns.
6 
  Because the life annuities available from PERS offer a risk-free rate of return of at least 
10 percent, retirees who overvalue the lump sum option are likely to be making a costly and irre-
versible mistake.  To put the economic magnitude of this mistake in context, consider the 453 
retirees who choose the lump sum option in 2000.  The average retiree trades life annuity pay-
ments with an expected present value of $225,421 for a lump sum of $151,367, suggesting an 
average loss of $74,054.
7 
  In Section 2, we discuss the existing empirical literature.  In Section 3, we motivate our 
empirical predictions and discuss identification.  In Section 4, we describe our data.  In Section 
5, we study how demand for lump sum payments varies with retiree characteristics, the relative 
value of the incremental life annuity payments, and recent equity market returns.  In Section 6, 
we conclude.  The Appendix provides a detailed description of the PERS benefit calculations. 
2.  Related Empirical Literature 
  Our findings complement existing studies of the choice between incremental life annui-
ties and lump sums.  Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) find evidence of adverse selection using data 
on life annuities purchased from a large U.K. annuity company.  Similarly, we find that ex post 
mortality is associated with lower demand for incremental life annuities, especially among retir-
                                                 
6 Benartzi (2001) provides evidence that employees allocate more of their 401(k) contributions to company stock 
when the company’s stock return over the prior decade is higher.  Similarly, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri 
and Tufano (1998) provide evidence of return chasing behavior by mutual fund investors.  However, Berk and 
Green (2004) argue that return chasing is not necessarily irrational when choosing mutual funds. 
7 This calculation ignores the fact that retirees with shorter-than-average life expectancy are more likely to choose 
the lump sum option, but it also ignores the insurance value that risk-averse retirees derive from life annuities.   7
ees who are more likely to be single.  Inkmann, Lopes, and Michaelides (2011) use cross-
sectional data from the 2002-2003 English Longitudinal Study of Ageing to study household 
demand for voluntary life annuities.  They find that demand responds to differences in life expec-
tancy, the level of already-annuitized income, and other household characteristics.  Then, they 
argue that a life-cycle model that incorporates demand for life annuities, life insurance, savings, 
and portfolio choice can rationalize the fact that only 5.9% of the households in their sample 
purchase incremental life annuities.  Interestingly, although PERS retirees’ characteristics have a 
qualitatively similar impact on demand for incremental life annuities, we find that 85% of the 
retirees in our sample choose incremental life annuities. 
  Bütler and Teppa (2007) study payout choices for ten Swiss pension funds.  Consistent 
with our findings, they find that the majority of retirees choose life annuities over lump sums.  
Therefore, the low demand for life annuities in the private market may reflect the fact that retir-
ees have access to sufficient life annuity income through their pensions, or it may signal that the 
search costs associated with shopping for a life annuity are high.  Previtero (2010) studies the 
choice between life annuity and lump sum payments by private employees using data from de-
fined benefit plans.  Consistent with our findings, he finds that demand for life annuities is nega-
tively correlated with recent stock market returns.  However, because the money’s worth of the 
life annuities in his setting match those available in the private market, the welfare cost of return 
chasing is lower than in our setting, where life annuities are better than actuarially fair. 
3.  Empirical Predictions 
  In a standard life-cycle model, life annuities increase expected utility by making the indi-
vidual’s consumption between retirement and death both higher and less uncertain.
8  In our set-
                                                 
8 Yaari (1965) derives conditions under which a retiree with an unknown date of death should convert all of her liq-
uid retirement assets into life annuities.  Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) extend this analysis by showing that   8
ting, incremental life annuity payments increase expected utility by increasing the level of risk-
free income, and therefore potential consumption, during retirement.  The lump sum option, on 
the other hand, trades incremental life annuity payments for a cash payment, which can be in-
vested in risky liquid assets, invested in safe liquid assets, or used to purchase goods and ser-
vices.
9  Therefore, the choice between the total life annuity and lump sum options should depend 
on the expected present value of incremental life annuity payments relative to the level of the 
lump sum payment, plus any option value associated with holding liquid assets.  We use his 
tradeoff to motivate our empirical predictions. 
  Note that because the vast majority of PERS incremental life annuities are better than ac-
tuarially fair, an implicit assumption throughout our paper is that market frictions limit the ability 
of retirees to convert life annuities into lump sums in the private market.  A natural and likely 
source of friction is asymmetric information about retiree life expectancy.  In the absence of the-
se frictions, all retirees with a normal life expectancy should choose the total life annuity option, 
and those who prefer a lump sum should convert some portion of their life annuity payments into 
a (larger) lump sum.   
3.1.  Variation in Retiree Characteristics 
  Our first set of predictions are based on the fact that differences in retiree characteristics 
can generate cross-sectional differences in the expected utility associated with life annuity pay-
ments.  Because Brown (2001), Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), Bütler and Teppa (2007), and 
Inkmann, Lopes, and Michaelides (2011) find support for related predictions, we are primarily 
                                                                                                                                                             
retirees would benefit from converting a significant fraction of their assets into life annuities under much less re-
striction conditions.  Life annuities in the private market are able to offer higher rates of return than other risk-free 
investments because they transfer assets from those who die to those who survive. 
9 Bequest motives typically reduce demand for life annuities. However, because the incremental life annuities that 
we study are better-than-actuarially fair, PERS retirees with bequest motives should choose the total life annuity 
option and use the monthly payments to purchase life insurance.    9
interested in exploring whether PERS retirees behave like the retirees studied in other settings. 
  We consider seven retiree characteristics.  First, because PERS does not adjust life annui-
ty payments for differences in retiree health, we predict that the lump sum option will be more 
valuable to single retirees in poor health, who should expect to receive fewer payments.  Second, 
because PERS does not adjust life annuity payments for the different life expectancies of males 
and females, we predict that the lump sum option will be more valuable to single male retirees, 
who should expect to receive fewer payments than single female retirees.  Third, like other forms 
of insurance, life annuities should be less valuable to a retiree who is less risk averse.  We predict 
that a retiree who allocates more of her retirement account allocations to the riskier of the two 
investment options will be more likely to choose the lump sum option.  Fourth, to the extent that 
police and fire officers’ greater tolerance for occupational risk translates into greater tolerance 
for financial risk, police and fire officers will be more likely to choose the lump sum option. 
Fifth, because the marginal value of insurance declines with the level of insurance, the value that 
a retiree attaches to the incremental life annuity should fall with the level of already-annuitized 
income.  We predict that demand for the lump sum option will rise with the level of the life an-
nuity payments under the lump sum option.  Sixth, we predict a retiree who is more reliant on 
PERS retirement benefits because she spent a larger fraction of her career working for PERS 
employers is less likely to choose the lump sum option.  Seventh, to the extent that financial lit-
eracy is positively correlated with income (Campbell (2006)), we predict that a retiree with a 
higher pre-retirement salary will be less likely to choose the lump sum payment over a better 
than actuarially fair life annuity. 
  Note that because all retirees receive some life annuity payments, retirees must also 
choose between single life annuities, which stop making payments when the retiree dies, and   10
joint life annuities, which stop making payments only after the retiree and their beneficiary have 
died.  Because joint life annuities are more likely to be chosen by married retirees, who must also 
consider the financial needs of their spouses, we expect the characteristics of retirees choosing 
joint life annuities to explain less variation in demand for lump sums (which is what Brown 
(2001) finds.)  Finally, Brown and Poterba (2000) argue that access to joint life annuities should 
make married retirees less likely to fully annuitize their retirement assets than single retirees.  
The complication with testing this prediction in our setting is that, although we lack the data 
needed to systematically compare the money’s worth of single and joint life annuities, calcula-
tions based on the actual payout options of a married retiree suggest that joint life annuities are 
significantly more generous than single life annuities. 
3.2.  Cross-Sectional Variation in Life Annuity Pricing 
  Our second set of predictions focus on plausibly exogenous cross-sectional variation in 
life annuity pricing arising from how PERS calculates retirement benefits.  To understand how 
we exploit this variation, it is necessary to provide additional details on how retirement benefits 
are determined under the total life annuity and lump sum options.  PERS employees contribute 
6% of their salary to a defined contribution-style retirement account with two investment op-
tions.  They have the option to invest 25%, 50% or 75% of their contribution to the riskier “vari-
able” account; the remainder is invested in the safer “regular” account.  The contributions and 
returns posted to these two accounts determine the accumulated account balance at retirement, 
which is the size of the lump sum payment under the lump sum option. 
  The level of the life annuity payment under the total life annuity option is automatically 
calculated as the maximum of three possible benefit formulae.  DC is a traditional defined con-
tribution retirement benefit that depends on the actuarial equivalency factor that PERS uses to   11
annuitize the retirement account balance.  DB is a traditional defined benefit retirement benefit 
that depends on years of service, salary history, whether the retiree is a police or fire officer, and 
an adjustment for early retirement.  DCDB is a hybrid benefit that equals half of DC plus slightly 
more than half of DB, but that is only available to employees who first contributed into PERS on 
or before August 1981.
10  The level of the life annuity payments under the lump sum option is 
automatically calculated as the maximum of two benefits: half of the total life annuity payment 
under DC or slightly more than half of the total life annuity payment under DB.  Eligibility for 
DCDB only impacts the level of the life annuity payments under the total life annuity option. 
  When comparing the total life annuity option to the lump sum option, life-cycle models 
predict that retires will compare the expected present value of the incremental life annuity pay-
ments under the total life annuity option to the lump sum payment they must forgo.  Dividing the 
incremental life annuity payment by the lump sum payment yields an annuity price that is analo-
gous to the actuarial equivalency factor quoted in the private market.  The fact that PERS uses 
multiple formulae to calculate life annuity payments under the total life annuity and lump sum 
options generates cross-sectional variation in this annuity price.  Depending on the combination 
of formulas used to calculate the maximum life annuity payments, the dollar value of the incre-
mental life annuity payments can range from 32.5% to 50% of the total life annuity payment.  If 
this variation in annuity pricing is salient to retirees, we predict that demand for the lump sum 
option will be lower when the relative value of the incremental life annuity payments is higher. 
  Because the total life annuity payments of retirees who first contributed into PERS after 
August 1981 are calculated using two formulae instead of three, there are circumstances under 
which these retirees are eligible for smaller incremental life annuity payments than retirees who 
                                                 
10 PERS refers to the DC, DB, and DCDB options as “Money Match”, “Full Formula”, and “Formula plus Annuity”.  
We state the various total life annuity and partial life annuity formulas in the Appendix.   12
first contributed into PERS on or before August 1981 (holding retiree characteristics and the re-
tirement account balance constant).  If this particular source of cross-sectional variation is sali-
ent, we predict that it will increase demand for the lump sum option. 
  While variation due to the choice of retirement benefit formulas would normally raise 
concerns about strategic behavior, PERS retirees automatically receive the maximum life annuity 
payments for which they are eligible.  While retirees can expect to increase their future retire-
ment benefits by working another year, or by allocating a larger fraction of their retirement con-
tributions to the risky investment, they have no influence over which formulas PERS uses to cal-
culate their life annuity payments under the total life annuity and lump sum options, and hence 
no influence over the level of the incremental life annuity payments. 
3.3.  Time-Series Variation in Life Annuity Pricing 
  The final prediction concerns variation in PERS life annuity pricing due to time-series 
variation in the risk-free rate.  In the market for private life annuities, insurance companies use 
the prevailing risk-free rate to set the actuarial equivalency factor, which determines the level of 
life annuity payment per dollar invested.  When interest rates fall, the actuarial equivalency fac-
tors available from TIAA and other insurance companies fall.  In contrast, the actuarial equiva-
lency factors that PERS uses in its retirement benefit calculations rarely change.  Because of this 
inertia, when the risk-free rate falls, life annuity payments available from PERS become relative-
ly more generous than the life annuity payments available from TIAA.  To be clear, lower inter-
est rates do not change the dollar value of the PERS incremental life annuity payments.  Instead, 
they increase the cost of buying the same incremental life annuity payments in the private mar-
ket.  Or, put differently, they increase the gap between the rate of return that retirees can earn on 
their retirement account balance by choosing the total life annuity option and the risk-free rate of   13
return available in the market.  For this reason, we predict that demand for the lump sum option 
will be lower when interest rates are lower. 
  There are several caveats.  The prediction that lower interest rates make life annuities 
more valuable is unique to our setting.  Milevsky and Young (2002) argue that retirees in the pri-
vate market should delay annuitization when interest rates are low, rather than lock in perma-
nently low life annuity payments.
11  The facts that PERS life annuity payments become relatively 
more valuable when the risk-free rate falls, and that they are only available at the time of retire-
ment, imply that PERS retirees are unlikely to benefit from delaying annuitization.   
  More importantly, our prediction holds the value of the lump sum payment constant.  To 
identify retirees’ choices as mistakes, we must rule out the possibility that lower interest rates 
rationally increase demand for risky liquid assets, safe liquid assets, or consumption.  Although 
we are limited by the fact that we do not observe whether the lump sum is invested or consumed, 
we are able to explicitly test two alternatives.  The first is that lower interest rates increase the 
value of already-annuitized income, and that the resulting income effect increases demand for the 
lump sum option.  The second is that lower interest rates proxy for greater economic uncertainty, 
which increases the value of the lump sum option by even more than it increases the value of the 
incremental life annuity payments.  To control for variation in economic uncertainty, we control 
for the level of the CBEO Volatility Index (VIX) at the end of the month before the payout 
choice.
12  If larger values of VIX, which is also known as the “fear index”, increase demand for 
liquid savings, the coefficient on the control variable will be positive.
13  
                                                 
11 Also see Tergesen, Anne, and Leslie Scism, “Are Annuities Being Overhyped as a Retirement Cure-All?”, Wall 
Street Journal, February 13, 2010. 
12 VIX measures the expected volatility on U.S. equity over the next 30 days.  It has been shown to be negatively 
correlated with mutual fund flows and other measures of investor sentiment.  See, for example, Ben-Rephael, 
Kandel, and Wohl (2010). 
13 On the other hand, Sundaresan (2001, p. 208) provides evidence that interest rate volatility is positively correlated 
with the level of interest rates.  Given the 2% annual cap on cost of living adjustments it seems just as likely that   14
  Finally, demand for the lump sum option may respond, for rational or behavioral reasons, 
to time-series variation in investor sentiment.  If fluctuations in interest rates and investor senti-
ment are correlated, and we do not control for fluctuations in investor sentiment, the coefficient 
on our measure of relative generosity will suffer from omitted variables bias.  To distinguish the 
impact of interest rates from the impact of the NASDAQ bubble, which burst toward the end of 
our sample period, we control for the inflation-adjusted level of the NASDAQ index, which has 
a correlation of 0.4638 with our measure of PERS generosity.  We also control for the return on 
the S&P 500 index over the prior 12 months.  To the extent that retirees forgo better than actuar-
ially fair life annuity payments in response to recent equity market conditions, they may be mak-
ing costly mistakes. 
3.4.  Measuring Variation in Life Annuity Pricing 
As introduced earlier, the money's worth of the incremental life annuity is the expected 
present value of the future life annuity payments, per dollar of initial outlay. The money's worth 
of the incremental life annuity payments available to retiree k is defined as: 
MWMax
k  A










k        ( 1 )  
where A
k is the initial level of the incremental life annuity payment to retiree k, P
k is the level of 
the forgone lump sum payment (i.e., the price of the incremental life annuity payments), and 
EPV 
k
g denotes the expected present value of retiree k receiving $1.00 in month 1, $1.00 (1+g) in 
month 2, …, until death, which depends on the probability that retiree k is alive to receive each 
payment.
14  When incremental life annuity payments are priced to be actuarially fair, money’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
higher interest rate volatility could generate more demand for lump sum payments, which could be invested in assets 
offering even better inflationary hedges.  This argument suggests that lower interest rates should decrease demand 
for the lump sum option. 
14 When estimating the expected present value of life annuity payments for retiree k in month t, we use the yield on 
10-year Treasury Notes on the first trading day of month t, and we use the mortality tables published by the Social   15
worth equals $1.00. 
  Life annuity payments are quoted in terms of actuarial equivalency factors, which state 
the (fixed, nominal) number of dollars paid out each month until death, per $1,000 in initial out-
lay.  When the maximal total life annuity and partial life annuity payments for retiree k are both 
calculated under DC, the money’s worth of the incremental life annuity payments is 
 























k   (2) 
where AEFPERS increases with retiree age, to reflect declining life expectancies, but does not vary 
with gender.
15  Because PERS life annuities include a cost of living adjustment that is capped at 
2.0% per year, and because that cap is binding throughout our sample period, we set g equal to 
0.17% per month.  To distinguish between the cross-sectional and time-series variation that we 
described in sections 3.2 and 3.3, we rewrite the money’s worth of the incremental life annuity 
































k     
k     
k    
  
 (3) 
The first term is the money’s worth of the life annuity that retiree k could purchase from TIAA 
with the lump sum payment, our proxy for how life annuities are priced in the private market. 
The second term, , captures cross-sectional variation arising when the maximum life annuity 
payments under the total life annuity and lump sum options are not both calculated using the DC 
benefit formulas.  For example,  captures cross-sectional differences in the money’s worth of 
retirees’ incremental annuity benefits based on whether they are ineligible for the DCDB total 
                                                                                                                                                             
Security Administration for 2004.  The second assumption leads us to slightly overestimate the estimated present 
value in 1990 relative to 2002. 
15 Finkelstein, Poterba, and Rothschild (2009) study the transfer from males to females that results from not allowing 
actuarial equivalency factors to vary with gender.  These restrictions apply to the market for pension annuities in the 
United Kingdom, Oregon's Public Employees Retirement System, and TIAA, among others.   16
life annuity benefit because they first contributed into PERS after August 1981.  The third term, 
, captures time-series variation in the value of PERS life annuities relative to those available 
from TIAA, which is driven by changes in the risk-free rate.   
4.  Data  
  Between January 1990 and June 2002, we observe the payout choices of 32,060 retirees 
between the ages of 50 and 70.  For each retiree, we observe whether she chooses the total life 
annuity option or the lump sum option.  We also observe her retirement account balance, her al-
location between the regular and variable account prior to retirement, her choice between a sin-
gle and joint life annuity, and the other demographic characteristics required to calculate her life 
annuity payments under the different benefit formulae for which she is eligible. 
In Table 1, we provide separate summary statistics for retirees whose total life annuity 
benefits are calculated using DC (66.4% of retirees), DB (9.8%), and DCDB (23.8%).  Columns 
(2) through (8) summarize inputs into the various life annuity benefit formulas, and columns (9) 
and (10) report the (initial) monthly life annuity payments under the total life annuity and lump 
sum options.  Monthly Salary (4), PERS retirement Account Balance (5), Total Life Annuity (9), 
Partial Life Annuity (10), and Incremental Life Annuity (11) are converted to December 2003 
dollars using the Consumer Price Index.   
Although PERS automatically determines which life annuity formula applies to each re-
tiree, the fact that columns (2) through (8) are inputs into these formulas results in significant 
differences in the panels of Table 1.  For example, life annuity payments calculated under DC are 
increasing in the level of the PERS retirement account balance, while payments calculated under 
DB are not.  Consequently, the average Account Balance ranges from $110,538 to $197,325 un-
der DC, but from $27,484 to $73,329 under DB.   17
Table 1 highlights the variation in annuity pricing faced by retirees whose maximal total 
life annuity payments are calculated under DC, DB, and DCDB.  Consider retirees in 1995.  In 
Panel A, the average retiree forgoes approximately 50% of the total life annuity monthly pay-
ment of $2,434 to receive an immediate lump sum payment of $141,662.  On the other hand, in 
Panel B, the retiree forgoes approximately 40% of the total life annuity monthly payment of 
$643 to receive an immediate lump sum payment of $27,484. 
  In Table 2, we illustrate how the relative value of PERS life annuity payments varies with 
the risk-free rate of return.  Specifically, we calculate the money’s worth of PERS incremental 
life annuity payments under DC for male retirees who turn 65 in January 1990, January 1991, …, 
January 2002.  We also calculate the money’s worth of the life annuity payments that retirees 
could purchase from TIAA using the lump sum payment.  For these retirees, the PERS life an-
nuity is always better than actuarially fair, with money’s worth ranging from $1.14 in January 
1990 to $1.50 in January 2002.   
  Within our sample of 32,060 retirees, the money’s worth of the incremental life annuity is 
better than actuarially fair for all but 112 retirees.  In contrast, the money’s worth of the life an-
nuities offered by TIAA is less volatile, and never more than $0.92.  For a 65-year old male in 
Table 2,  ranges from 1.30 to 1.77.  Within our full sample of retirees,  ranges from 1.17 to 
1.82, with an average value of 1.60.  The main source of time-series variation in  is the fact that 
TIAA adjusts its actuarial equivalency factors each January, based on changes in annuitant life 
expectancy and the risk-free rate, whereas PERS does not.
16  In the bottom row of Table 2, we 
show that the correlation between the yield on 10-Year U.S. Treasury Notes and TIAA’s actuari-
                                                 
16 PERS adjusts its actuarial equivalency factor tables once during our sample period.  On January 1, 1997, PERS 
switches from actuarial equivalency factors that increase annually, in the retiree’s birth month, to factors that in-
crease monthly.   At the same time, PERS increases actuarial equivalency factors for those retiring below the age of 
55.  However, the increases are small, ranging from 2.2% at age 50 to 0.1% at age 54.    18
al equivalency factors (column (4)) is 0.935.  We also show that the correlation between the 
Treasury yield and  (column (9)) is -0.955.   
5.  How Do PERS Retirees Value Incremental Life Annuities?   
Table 3 reports the fraction of PERS retirees choosing the lump sum option each year.  
Notably, only 15% choose the lump sum option; the other 85% choose to receive all of their re-
tirement benefits in the form of life annuity payments.  The high demand for incremental life an-
nuities in our setting is striking, and is consistent with the fact that PERS incremental life annui-
ties have much higher money’s worth than life annuities available in the private market.  
The low demand for lump sum payments is also consistent with alternative explanations.  
It may reflect the fact that individuals with greater demand for annuitized retirement benefits are 
more likely to become public employees.  It may reflect the fact that it is easier for employees to 
choose the total life annuity payout option over the lump sum option than it is for other retirees 
to research and purchase incremental life annuities in the private market.  Or, because PERS re-
ports the monthly payment associated with each payout option rather than the implied rate of re-
turn, it may reflect the framing effect described in Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, and Wrobel 
(2008).  We cannot measure the impact of these explanations on the average demand for lump 
sum payments.  However, because they are time-invariant, they are unlikely to explain time-
series variation in the fraction of retirees choosing the lump sum option. 
5.1. Time-Series Regressions 
  Figure 1 reveals significant time-series variation in the fraction of retirees choosing the 
lump sum option, and Table 3 shows that this variation exists regardless of how the total life an-
nuity benefit is calculated.  In Table 4, we seek to explain this time-series variation in demand 
for the lump sum option.  The dependent variable in each time-series regression is the fraction of   19
retirees that choose the lump sum option in month t.  Because the number of retirements varies 
significantly across months (from a low of 6 in January 1990 to a high of 2,999 in February 
1998), this fraction is a noisier estimate of retiree preferences in some months than others.  To 
account for this heteroskedasticity, we weight each observation by the number of retirements in 
that month.  Standard errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) estimator, allowing 
autocorrelation to persist for 24 months.   
  Our basic prediction is that demand for the lump sum option will fall when incremental 
life annuities are more valuable.  Yet, in column (1), we find that demand for the lump sum op-
tion rises when PERS life annuities are relatively more generous than those available from 
TIAA.  The coefficient is statistically significant at the 1-percent level.  It is also economically 
significant.  A one-standard deviation increase in the relative generosity of PERS is associated 
with a 3.2 percentage point increase in the demand for the lump sum option.  In other words, 
demand for lump sums is increasing precisely when the relative value of the incremental life an-
nuities available from PERS is increasing.  One interpretation is that retirees are confused about 
the impact of interest rates on the value of PERS life annuity payments.  For example, they may 
be following advice like that in Milevsky and Young (2002) to delay annuitization when the risk-
free rate is low—despite the fact that this advice does not apply in our setting.  However, as we 
discuss in Section 3.3, it is important to control for variation in economic conditions and investor 
sentiment that may lead retirees to prefer a lump sum despite the lower interest rates.  
  We learn three things when we control for the return on the S&P 500 index over the prior 
12 months, the level of VIX in the prior month, and the inflation-adjusted level of NASDAQ in 
the prior month.  First, the coefficient on our measure of PERS generosity falls by approximately 
60% between column (1) and column (4), highlighting the need to control for variation in eco-  20
nomic conditions and investor sentiment.  Second, the coefficient nevertheless remains positive 
and statistically significant at the 1-percent level in columns (2) through (4), and at the 10-
percent level when we switch from levels to first differences in column (5).  It also remains posi-
tive and statistically significant at the 1-percent level in an unreported regression that ends the 
sample in December 1998, to exclude the NASDAQ crash.  In other words, regardless of how we 
control for economic conditions and investor sentiment, we find no evidence that retirees under-
stand that lower interest rates increase the value of PERS life annuity payments.
17 
  The third insight is that economic conditions and investor sentiment help to explain de-
mand for the lump sum option.  We find some evidence that demand for the lump sum option is 
increasing in both the level of VIX and the inflation-adjusted level of NASDAQ in the month 
immediately before the payout choice.  However, the estimated coefficient on VIX is not statisti-
cally significant when we control for the level of NASDAQ.  Our most robust finding is that de-
mand for the lump sum option rises with recent equity market returns (p-value of 0.001).  In 
terms of economic significance, a one-standard deviation increase in the lagged return on the 
S&P 500 index is associated with a 2.2 to 2.6 percentage point increase in the demand for the 
lump sum option.  The most provocative interpretation of this correlation is that retirees are ex-
trapolating future equity market returns from recent equity market returns, and then using the 
lump sum payment to chase recent equity market returns.
18  
5.2.  Predicting Individual Demand for the Lump Sum Option 
  We now turn our attention to individual-level retirement payout choices.  In Table 5, we 
                                                 
17 In an unreported specification, we include the fraction of retirees who chose the lump sum payment in the previ-
ous month, as a control for the impact of economic conditions and investor sentiment in the prior month, as well as 
the P/E ratio on the S&P 500 index in the prior quarter.  The coefficient on our measure of PERS generosity increas-
es from 0.111, in column (4), to 0.137, and remains statistically significant from zero at the 1-percent level. 
18 The return chasing interpretation is consistent with behavior that Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and 
Tufano (1998) observe in the mutual fund industry, and that Benartzi (2001) observes when studying how investors 
allocate 401(k) plan assets to company stock.   21
report marginal effects from five logit models where the dependent variable equals one if retiree 
k chooses the lump sum option, and zero if she chooses the total life annuity option.  We use 
three sets of independent variables to explain the individual payout choices of 31,809 retirees.
19  
The first set measures differences in retiree characteristics, including differences in life expec-
tancy, risk aversion, and the level of life annuity income under the lump sum option.  The second 
set measures variation in the money’s worth of the incremental life annuity payments, which dis-
tills our cross-sectional and time-series variation into a single measure of annuity pricing.  (In 
Table 6, we distinguish between different sources of variation in money’s worth.)  The third set 
controls for economic conditions and investor sentiment.  It includes the lagged return on the 
S&P 500 index, the lagged return earned in the retiree’s PERS retirement account, the inflation-
adjusted level of NASDAQ measured at the end of the previous month, the level of VIX at the 
end of the previous month, and the local (county-level) unemployment rate. 
  Each specification includes a separate fixed effect for each year of service (1, 2, 3, …) to 
control for variation in payout choices that is related to length of service within PERS.  Columns 
(2) through (5) also include a separate fixed effect for each year of age (50, 51, 52, …) to control 
for variation in payout choices that is related to age at retirement.
20  Because retirees choosing 
joint life annuities are more likely to be married, their payout choices should depend on the char-
acteristics of the retirees, which we observe, and on the characteristics of the spouses, which we 
do not observe.  For this reason, in columns (3) and (4), we separately estimate logit models for 
retirees who choose single life annuities versus joint life annuities.  Column (5) includes a sepa-
rate fixed effect for each calendar year, to capture average changes in macroeconomic conditions 
                                                 
19 In Table 5, we exclude 251 retirees because we lack data on the location of their most-recent employer.  Without 
these data, we are unable to control for the local unemployment rate.  Our inferences are unchanged when we in-
clude these retirees and drop our control for the local unemployment rate.  
20 Our inferences are unchanged when we estimate linear probability models instead of logits.   22
or retiree preferences.  Standard errors are clustered on each month in the sample (January 1990, 
February 1990, …, June 2002) to capture the cross-sectional correlation in economic conditions 
for retirees making choices in the same month.  Inference is similar when we instead cluster 
standard errors at the employer or county level. 
5.2.1.  Variation in Retiree Characteristics 
  When we focus on cross-sectional variation in the value of the incremental life annuity 
payments caused by differences in retiree characteristics, our findings are broadly consistent with 
the predictions of life-cycle models.  We test for adverse selection in two ways.  First, we exploit 
data on ex post mortality.  Among retirees who choose a single life annuity, those who die 1-24 
months after retirement are 17.7 percentage points more likely to choose the lump sum option (p-
value of 0.001), while those who die 25-48 months after retirement are no more likely to do so.  
This suggests that single retirees’ choices are most sensitive to deaths occurring within 24 
months of retirement.  However, as expected, among retirees who choose a joint life annuity, and 
are therefore more likely to be maximizing retirement income for both the retiree and spouse, we 
find weaker evidence at both horizons (p-values of 0.065 and 0.091).  Second, we find that de-
mand for the lump sum option is lower for female retirees; the difference ranges from 8.2 per-
centage points (p-value of 0.000) for those choosing single life annuities to 2.7 percentage points 
(0.000) for those choosing joint life annuities. 
  Consistent with longevity insurance being less valuable to retirees who are less risk 
averse, we find that retirees that allocate a positive fraction of their employee contribution to the 
riskier investment option are more likely to choose the lump sum option.  The estimated margin-  23
al effect ranges from 1.7 to 2.1 percentage points.
21  The fact that police and fire officers are less 
likely to choose the lump sum option may reflect higher levels of financial risk aversion. 
  To measure the impact of already-annuitized retirement benefits on the demand for the 
lump sum option, we include the dollar value of the life annuity payment under the lump sum 
option (measured in December 2003 dollars).  The estimated coefficients are all statistically sig-
nificant at the 1-percent level.  They are also economically significant, with a one-standard devi-
ation increase in monthly life annuity payments ($879) increasing demand for the lump sum be-
tween 3.0 and 5.2 percentage points.  We obtain similar (unreported) results when we scale the 
level of already-annuitized monthly income by the retiree’s pre-retirement monthly salary. 
  An interesting exception to the positive relation between already-annuitized income lev-
els and demand for the lump sum option is that, in column (1), we find significantly lower de-
mand for the lump sum option by retirees who are old enough to be receiving Social Security 
benefits (62+).  One interpretation is that younger retirees are more likely to use the lump sum to 
acquire new skills and re-enter the labor force, whereas older retirees are more likely to perma-
nently exit the labor force.  This interpretation may help to explain why, in column (1), we find 
that individuals retiring before the normal retirement age are 2.7 percentage points more likely to 
choose the lump sum option.  And, it may help to explain why Warner and Pleeter (2001) find 
much higher demand for lump sum payments by personnel separating from the military (with an 
average age of 31) than we find by public retirees (with an average age of 59).
22 
  As predicted, we find that retirees who spend a larger fraction of their careers with PERS 
                                                 
21 Although higher demand for lump sum payments by male retirees is potentially consistent with gender-based dif-
ferences in risk aversion (Barber and Odean (2001)), the estimated marginal effect of the positive allocation to the 
variable account dummy variable is similar when we restrict the sample to female retirees (2.0 percentage points). 
22 Warner and Pleeter (2001) study the choice between lump sum and non-life annuity payments in a sample of indi-
viduals separating from the military.  Although the annuities in their sample are also quite valuable, they find strong 
demand for the lump sum.  This is especially true among enlisted personnel, who may need to invest in new skills to 
re-enter the labor force.   24
employers have significantly lower demand for the lump sum option, and that the effect is ap-
proximately three times larger for retirees choosing the single life annuity.
23  We also find that 
retirees whose pre-retirement salary are in the top quartile of retirees are between 2.7 and 3.3 
percentage points less likely to choose the lump sum option, which is consistent with the possi-
bility that higher salaries proxy for higher levels of financial literacy. 
  While the arguments in Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Brown and Poterba (2000) pre-
dict that single retirees will be less likely to choose the lump sum option, we find that retirees 
choosing the single life annuity are 7.7 to 8.1 percentage points (p-values of 0.000) more likely 
to choose the lump sum option.  One possible explanation is that households respond to the fact 
that PERS incremental life annuities are better than actuarially fair by having the spouse choose 
not to annuitize her retirement assets, but we do not observe the annuitization choice of the 
spouse.  Another possible explanation is that retirees recognize that the joint life annuities avail-
able from PERS are even better deals than single life annuities. 
  Overall, these findings lead us to conclude that PERS retirees understand how salient dif-
ferences in life expectancy, risk aversion, and the level of already-annuitized income impact the 
value of the incremental life annuity.
24  Given their consistency with other studies, these findings 
help to allay concerns about the representativeness of our sample. 
5.2.2. Variation in Life Annuity Pricing, Economic Conditions, and Investor Sentiment 
  If retirees recognize and respond to variation in PERS life annuity pricing then demand 
for the lump sum option should be lower when the value of the incremental life annuity pay-
ments is higher.  Instead, we find that the natural logarithm of money’s worth has a positive and 
                                                 
23 Controlling for whether the retiree is eligible for “Tier 2” benefits, because she did not contribute into PERS be-
fore January 1997, has no additional impact on demand for the lump sum option.  Tier 2 members face higher nor-
mal retirement ages than other members (60 versus 58), but only account for 85 of the 31,809 retirees in our sample. 
24 Similarly, Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) find that mutual fund investor flows respond most strongly to those 
fees that are the most salient.   25
statistically significant impact on the demand for the lump sum option across all five specifica-
tions.  In terms of economic significance, a one-standard deviation increase in money’s worth 
increases the probability of choosing the lump sum option by approximately one percentage 
point in the full sample.  While the economic effect is modest, it is the opposite of what we pre-
dict.  One interpretation is that retirees are confused by variation in the value of incremental life 
annuity payments that is unrelated to variation in retiree characteristics. 
  An alternative interpretation is that falling interest rates increase the expected utility of 
the lump sum payment by even more than they increase the expected utility of the incremental 
life annuity payments.  We consider two possible mechanisms.  The first is that lower interest 
rates increase the expected present value of the life annuity payments under the lump sum option, 
and that the resulting income effect decreases the relative value of the incremental life annuity.  
To test this alternative, we estimate (but do not report) two additional versions of the specifica-
tion in column (2).  When we replace the dollar value of the life annuity payment under the lump 
sum option with the natural logarithm of its expected present value, we continue to find a posi-
tive and statistically significant impact on demand for the lump sum option.  However, the eco-
nomic significance is reduced by approximately 20 percent.  This suggests that the expected pre-
sent value is a noisy proxy for the dollar value, which is more salient.  When we simultaneously 
control for the dollar value and the expected present value, the estimated marginal effect on the 
dollar value is positive and statistically significant while the estimated marginal effect on the ex-
pected present value is negative and statistically insignificant.  Importantly, the estimated coeffi-
cients on the other independent variables—including money’s worth—are virtually identical to 
those reported in column (2). 
  The second possible mechanism is that lower interest rates proxy for greater economic   26
uncertainty and that greater economic uncertainty increases the relative value of the lump sum 
payment.  In Table 5, we include the level of VIX to control for macroeconomic uncertainty and 
the unemployment rate in the county of the retiree’s former employer to control for local eco-
nomic conditions.  While our point estimates suggest that demand for the lump sum increases 
with VIX and decreases with the unemployment rate, the statistical evidence is weak.  The more 
important result is that including these proxies has no impact on the marginal effect associated 
with money’s worth.  When we exclude both of these proxies for economic conditions we find 
(in an unreported specification) that the marginal effect on money’s worth remains 0.045.  Fur-
thermore, in column (5), we continue to find a positive (albeit approximately 35 percent smaller) 
relation between money’s worth and demand for the lump sum option.  Because this specifica-
tion includes calendar year fixed effects it controls for the average impact of economic condi-
tions within each year. 
  While it remains possible that low interest rates increase the value of the lump sum pay-
ment by more than they increase the value of the incremental life annuity payments, it is worth 
emphasizing that these increases need to be large.  Changes in the risk-free rate cause the pay-
ments available from PERS to fluctuate between being 25% and 73% more generous than those 
available from TIAA.   
  When we focus on our other proxies for market conditions and investor sentiment in Ta-
ble 5, we continue to find a strong and statistically significant relation between equity market 
conditions and demand for the lump sum option.  Within the full sample, a one standard devia-
tion increase in the level of NASDAQ is associated with a 2.6 percentage point increase in the 
probability of choosing the lump sum option.  Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the 
return on the S&P 500 index over the prior 12 months is associated with a 2.9 percentage point   27
increase in this probability.  In contrast, the return earned in the PERS retirement account over 
the prior 12 months has no direct effect on the demand for the lump sum option.
25  As we dis-
cussed above, the most provocative interpretation of these findings is that retirees are using re-
cent equity market returns—which are likely to be salient—to infer future equity market returns.  
Unfortunately, because we do not observe whether the lump sum payment is invested in equity, 
we cannot test for return chasing. 
  The individual-level data do, however, allow us to test the alternative interpretation that 
higher equity market returns increase household wealth outside of PERS retirement benefits, 
which then increases demand for cash or consumption.  Specifically, we identify subsamples of 
retirees for whom the PERS retirement account is likely to be a larger fraction of their total 
wealth, and then test whether demand for the lump sum option by these retirees is less sensitive 
to recent equity market returns.  Since retirees choosing single life annuities are more likely to be 
single, they should have fewer sources of outside wealth than retirees choosing joint life annui-
ties.  Yet, the marginal effects associated with equity market returns are similar for retirees 
choosing a single life annuity or a joint life annuity (0.145 versus 0.164).  We find similar effects 
when, in unreported specifications, we focus on the subsample of retirees with 20 or more years 
of service within PERS (0.154), or the subsample of retirees with 20 or more years of service 
who choose a single life annuity (0.147).
26  The fact that different subsamples of retirees exhibit 
similar sensitivity to recent equity market returns argues against an interpretation based on 
changes in outside wealth. 
5.2.3.  Exploiting Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Variation in Life Annuity Pricing 
                                                 
25 Chalmers, Johnson, and Reuter (2008) describe features of PERS that significantly reduce the correlation between 
the returns on the S&P 500 index and those posted to PERS retirement account balances. 
26 Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) and Lusardi and Tufano (2008) find that financial literacy is lower among women.  
When we estimate separate specifications for males and females, we find that the estimated sensitivity to lagged 
equity returns is higher for males (0.174) than females (0.133), but the difference is not statistically significant.   28
  In Table 6, we decompose money’s worth into the three terms described by equation (3).  
The first term is the money’s worth of the incremental life annuity that can be purchased from 
TIAA.  Because TIAA adjusts its actuarial equivalency factors each January, in response to 
changes in the risk-free rate, the money’s worth of the life annuity available from TIAA exhibits 
little variation.  Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficient on this term is small and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. 
 The  second  term,  , captures plausibly exogenous cross-sectional variation in the dollar 
value of the incremental life annuity payments arising from the use of multiple benefit formulae.  
Because retirees always receive the maximum incremental life annuity payments for which they 
are eligible, variation in money’s worth based on how PERS calculates life annuity payments 
should be uncorrelated with retiree preferences for incremental life annuities versus lump sums.  
While the predicted coefficient on  is negative, the estimated coefficient is positive and statisti-
cally significant.  However, the economic magnitude is small.  A one standard deviation increase 
in  only increases the probability of choosing the lump sum option by 0.41 percentage points. 
  Part of the variation in  arises from the fact that retirees who first contribute into PERS 
after August 1981 are not eligible for the DCDB total life annuity benefit.  Among the 21.1% of 
retirees who are not eligible for DCDB, approximately half (10.1% of the full sample) face lower 
incremental life annuity payments at retirement because of this ineligibility.  In column (2), we 
distinguish variation in the value of incremental life annuity payments due to other sources (1) 
from variation due to ineligibility for DCDB (2).  When we focus on 2, we finally find evi-
dence that lower money’s worth is associated with higher demand for the lump sum option.  But, 
here too, the economic magnitude is small.  A one-standard deviation decrease in money’s worth 
due to ineligibility for DCDB is associated with a 0.41 percentage point increase in demand for   29
the lump sum.  The dummy variable indicating whether retiree k is ineligible for DCDB controls 
for the possibility that individuals accepting jobs as public employees after a reduction in the ex-
pected retirement benefits attach less value to life annuities.  However, none of the estimated 
marginal effects are positive and statistically significant. 
  The third term, , measures the money’s worth of the incremental life annuity payments 
under DC relative to the money’s worth of life annuity payments available from TIAA—the 
same source of plausibly exogenous time-series variation that we study in Table 4.  The estimat-
ed coefficient is positive and statistically significant.  In terms of economic significance, a one 
standard deviation increase in the relative value of the incremental life annuities available from 
PERS is associated with a 2.5 percentage point increase in demand for the lump sum. 
  To summarize, the evidence that retirees respond to cross-sectional variation in money’s 
worth driven by formulaic eccentricities of the PERS benefit calculations is weak.  And, despite 
our numerous controls for retiree characteristics, economic conditions, and investor sentiment, 
we find no evidence that demand for the lump sum option responds in the predicted direction to 
time-series variation in interest rates.  
5.2.4.  Robustness 
  We perform robustness tests in the remaining columns of Table 6.  In column (3) our goal 
is to identify retirees whose choice of retirement date is driven more by retirement eligibility 
than by the level of their retirement benefits, so we restrict the sample to retirees who are 58 
years old and for whom the normal retirement age is 58.  Our main results hold within this much 
smaller sample, albeit in some cases with lower levels of statistical significance.  They also hold 
when, in column (4), we include the fraction of the retiree’s coworkers that chose the lump sum 
option over the prior 12 months.  We view this specification as controlling for employer-level   30
heterogeneity in the preference for incremental life annuities versus lump sums.
27 
  To explore the possibility that retirees rely on less sophisticated—but more salient—
measures than money’s worth, we include two additional dummy variables in column (5).  The 
first indicates whether the lump sum payment (measured in December 2003 dollars) is in the top 
10% of those offered to PERS retirees; the second indicates whether the incremental life annuity 
payments (measured in December 2003 dollars) are in the bottom 10% of those offered to PERS 
retirees.  The estimated coefficients on both variables are statistically and economically signifi-
cant.  Retirees facing “large” lump sum payments are 4.6 percentage points more likely to 
choose the lump sum option, and those facing “small” incremental life annuity payments are 4.6 
percentage points more likely to choose the lump sum option.
28  While these findings support the 
idea that retirees rely on ad hoc rules when choosing between the total life annuity and lump sum 
options, including them has little impact on the estimated coefficients on the other independent 
variables.  In particular, we continue to find that demand for the lump sum option increases (ra-
ther than decreases) with the money’s worth of the incremental life annuities, and with recent 
equity market returns. 
6.  Conclusion  
  To determine how retirees value life annuities, we compare the actual payout choices of a 
large sample of Oregon public employees to the predictions of a life-cycle model.  Because life 
annuities provide stable income until death, and because the incremental life annuities available 
from PERS are better than actuarially fair, we predict that average demand for the lump sum op-
                                                 
27 Chalmers, Johnson, and Reuter (2008) provide evidence of peer effects in the retirement timing decision.  Here, 
we have the more modest goal of using coworker behavior to capture otherwise unobservable heterogeneity in retir-
ee preferences. 
28 Based on a survey of 2,600 employees and 2,400 retirees in 2007, Watson Wyatt concludes that “Most employees 
want a lump sum—if it's big enough.”  The survey is summarized in “Who Prefers Annuities? Observations About 
Retirement Decisions,” published in April 2008 issue of Watson Wyatt Insider.   31
tion will be low.  Consistent with this prediction, we find that 85% of PERS retirees choose the 
total life annuity option.  This is much greater demand for incremental life annuities than has 
been documented in other settings.  
  Whether and how retirees respond to variation in the value of life annuity payments, 
however, depends crucially on the source of variation.  When we focus on salient and easily un-
derstood variation due to differences in retiree characteristics our findings are consistent with 
both theory and the existing literature.  When we focus on sources of plausibly exogenous varia-
tion in life annuity pricing that are unique to our setting, but arguably less salient, our findings 
are difficult to reconcile with theory.  The evidence that retirees respond to cross-sectional varia-
tion in life annuity pricing is limited to a single source of variation in the level of the incremental 
life annuity payments, and the implied elasticity is small.  Moreover, when we exploit exogenous 
variation in life annuity pricing arising from time-series variation in the risk-free rate, we find no 
evidence that demand for the lump sum option falls when interest rates are lower.  Instead, we 
find that demand for the lump sum option is higher when equity returns have been higher.  We 
believe that these last two findings are best explained by financial illiteracy.   
  However, an alternative interpretation is that retirees are solving more complicated opti-
mization problems than we appreciate.  For example, time-series variation in demand for the 
lump sum option may be driven by time-series variation in the level of financial constraints.  
Although it seems unlikely to us that the level of financial constraints increases with recent equi-
ty market returns and decreases with the interest rate, we cannot directly test this alternative.  
Nor can we directly test the alternative that retirees understand that when interest rates fall, the 
level of PERS underfunding rises, exposing retirees who choose the total lump sum option to 
greater political risk.  However, the level of financial constraints or perceived political risk   32
would need to increase significantly to justify forgoing life annuity payments with an expected 
present value of $1.45 (or more) for $1.00 in cash.  Finally, what we classify as retiree mistakes 
may reflect self-interested advice from financial advisors seeking assets under management.  It is 
plausible that it is easier to convince retirees to choose the lump sum option and roll it over to an 
IRA when recent equity returns are higher and current interest rates are low.   
  Regardless of how we interpret the impact of interest rates and equity market returns on 
demand for lump sums, our paper offers two lessons to policy makers interested in increasing 
annuitization rates.   To the extent that we find any evidence that retirees respond rationally to 
changes in annuity pricing, the effect is small.  This suggests that small changes in annuity pric-
ing due, for example, to the introduction of tax subsidies or longevity bonds (Brown and Orszag 
(2006)) are unlikely to increase annuitization rates by an economically significant amount.  On 
the other hand, the fact that we find high demand for the total life annuity option suggests that 
retirees may respond strongly to large, salient changes in annuity prices.  But, given the evidence 
in Madrian and Shea (2001) and Bütler and Teppa (2007), we believe that policy makers should 
explore the efficacy of more cost-effective solutions to low annuitization rates, such as making 
life annuities the default retirement payout choice in retirement plans. 
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 Appendix.  Determinants of PERS Incremental Life Annuity Payments 
In this appendix, we describe the formulas used to calculate life annuity payments under 
the total life annuity and lump sum options.  There are four inputs.  The first input, xDB, captures 
the defined benefit aspect of PERS retirement benefits, while the second input, xDC, captures the 
defined contribution aspect of PERS retirement benefits.  Formally, 
xDB  Final Average Salary    Years of Service    Adjustment for Early Retirement
xDC  Account Balance    AEFPERS
 
where xDB equals the retiree’s final average salary times years of service times a factor that re-
duces benefits when retiring before the normal retirement age, and xDC equals the retiree’s PERS 
account balance times the actuarial equivalency factor that PERS uses to convert this account 
balance into a (baseline) life annuity payment.  AEFPERS depends on age but not gender.  The 
third input is a dummy variable, IPF, that indicates whether the retiree is eligible for police and 
fire benefits, which are more generous than those available to normal members.  The fourth input 
is a dummy variable, IDCDB, that indicates whether the retiree contributed into PERS by August 
1981; if so, the retiree is eligible for total life annuity payments calculated under DCDB.  




(xDB (0.0100 0.0035 IPF) xDC) IDCDB










When the retiree is eligible for the DCDB benefit, it equals 50.0% of the DC benefit plus 59.9% 
of the DB benefit for normal retirees (67.5% of the DB benefit for police and fire).  Regardless of 
which formula gives the maximum total life annuity payment, the level of the life annuity pay-
ment under the lump sum option is calculated as the maximum of two possible benefits:     34
  PLA  max
xDC






neither of which depend on eligibility for the DCDB total life annuity benefit.   
  In Table A1, we calculate two ratios that summarize tradeoffs between the total life annu-
ity and lump sum options.  One panel focuses on normal retirees; the other panel focuses on po-
lice and fire officers.   The first ratio is the incremental life annuity payment divided by the total 
life annuity payment.  It ranges from 32.5% for police and fire retiring under DB, to 40.1% for 
normal retirees retiring under DB, to 50.0% for anyone retiring under DC.  In rows (b) and (c), 
when DCDB offers the highest total life annuity payment, DCDB-eligible retirees face larger in-
cremental life annuity payments than DCDB-ineligible retirees. 
 The  second  ratio,  , is the money’s worth of the actual incremental life annuity payments 
divided by the money’s worth of the incremental life annuity payments under DC.  Because there 
are values of DC and DB for which DCDB-ineligible retirees receive lower total life annuity 
payments—but the same life annuity payments under the lump sum option—there are values of 
xDC and xDB for which DCDB-ineligible retirees will find the lump sum option relatively more 
attractive.  For DCDB-eligible retirees,  equals one when the total life annuity payment is calcu-
lated under DC and DCDB, and is greater than one under DB.  For DCDB-ineligible retirees, 
however,  can be as low as 0.65.  Note that when  equals one, variation in   is driven entirely 
by retiree age.  This reflects that fact that PERS does not adjusts its actuarial equivalency factors 
during our sample period, and the fact that we estimate the expected present discount value of 
the incremental life annuity payments available to each retiree using mortality tables from 2004.   35
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Figure 1.  Fraction of PERS Employees choosing lump sum option and lagged stock return, 1990-2002 
 
Monthly time-series plot of the fraction of retirees in each month that choose the lump sum option (scale on the left axis) and the return on the S&P 500 index 










































































































































































































































































Fraction choosing lump sum option Return on S&P 500 index over prior 12 months  38
Table 1. Oregon PERS Retirees’ Characteristics – January 1990 – June 2002  
 
This table reports summary statistics for individuals between the ages of 50 and 70 retiring from the Oregon Public Employees Retirement System (PERS), who 
begin collecting retirement benefits immediately after leaving employment.  Panels A, B, and C focus on retirees whose total life annuity benefits are calculated 
under DC, DB, and DCDB, respectively.  Age reports the average members’ age in the month of retirement; Years of Service reports the average number of years 
that the member contributed into PERS; Monthly Salary is the average of members’ PERS salary averaged over the prior 36 months; Account Balance is the av-
erage value of the members’ PERS retirement account balances at the time of retirement, which determines the size of the lump sum payout; % Female measures 
the fraction of retirees who are female; % Police or Fire measures the fraction of retirees who previously worked as police or fire officers; and % Retiring Early 
measures the fraction of members who retire before reaching the normal retirement age.  Total Life Annuity is the average level of the initial monthly payment 
under the total life annuity option, while Partial Life Annuity is the average level of the initial monthly payment under the lump sum option.  Monthly Salary, 
Account Balance, Total Life Annuity, and Partial Life Annuity are converted into December 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
 
   # Retirees  Age 







% Police & 












   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Panel A.  Retirees for Whom Total Life Annuity Payment Determined by DC   
1990  336 60.6 17.5 $4,555 $110,538 3.3% 35.7% 30.4% $1,921 $961 $960
1991  882 60.9 19.2 $4,309 $123,313 2.4% 40.0% 23.4% $2,153 $1,078 $1,075
1992  544 61.0 19.7 $4,452 $119,422 4.2% 35.1% 27.6% $2,093 $1,048 $1,046
1993  924 60.6 20.8 $4,519 $133,868 2.8% 36.6% 27.6% $2,317 $1,161 $1,157
1994  1,104 60.5 21.4 $4,574 $136,170 3.0% 41.6% 28.5% $2,354 $1,180 $1,175
1995  1,138 60.3 20.9 $4,265 $141,662 3.0% 49.0% 25.3% $2,434 $1,219 $1,215
1996  1,220 60.2 21.9 $4,315 $142,426 2.8% 47.5% 23.2% $2,443 $1,225 $1,217
1997  1,785 59.8 21.7 $4,359 $155,781 4.3% 52.8% 23.9% $2,667 $1,337 $1,330
1998  3,635 59.1 22.2 $4,469 $174,448 4.4% 53.6% 33.6% $2,941 $1,473 $1,467
1999  3,614 58.5 21.7 $4,528 $181,613 6.0% 54.8% 38.0% $3,020 $1,513 $1,507
2000  1,691 58.3 20.8 $4,484 $178,727 8.4% 55.5% 38.6% $2,954 $1,482 $1,472
2001  2,311 58.4 22.2 $4,603 $188,586 7.4% 55.6% 32.2% $3,126 $1,567 $1,558
2002  2,089 58.3 23.2 $4,726 $197,325 6.8% 57.1% 34.3% $3,268 $1,641 $1,627  39
Table 1 – (continued) 
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   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Panel B.  Retirees for Whom Total Life Annuity Payment Determined by DB   
1990  299 58.8  22.6 $4,413 $73,329 17.1% 44.1% 4.0% $1,829 $1,136 $693
1991  180 59.5  19.1 $4,203 $56,450 20.0% 45.0% 7.2% $1,531 $956 $575
1992  272 59.9  17.7 $4,397 $57,921 19.1% 46.7% 7.0% $1,468 $918 $551
1993  276 61.2  14.8 $4,080 $41,867 19.6% 43.5% 5.8% $1,149 $725 $423
1994  496 60.5  16.0 $4,242 $51,231 16.1% 48.2% 7.3% $1,303 $816 $487
1995  186 61.1  11.4 $3,507 $27,484 10.8% 52.7% 11.3% $643 $392 $251
1996  316 60.8  12.1 $4,004 $37,218 13.9% 52.2% 5.1% $891 $553 $338
1997  248 60.2  12.8 $4,063 $40,179 16.9% 57.3% 11.7% $915 $566 $349
1998  197 60.1  13.4 $4,129 $41,022 19.3% 60.9% 17.8% $977 $604 $373
1999  182 60.0  12.9 $3,766 $35,421 22.5% 54.4% 15.9% $829 $514 $315
2000  106 60.1  11.2 $4,235 $36,803 20.8% 37.7% 14.2% $842 $521 $322
2001  198 60.2  12.6 $4,303 $42,585 15.7% 48.5% 13.6% $973 $599 $374
2002  198 60.5  11.5 $4,179 $36,480 15.2% 60.6% 14.6% $827 $508 $319
                       
Panel C.  Retirees for Whom Total Life Annuity Payment Determined by DCDB   
1990  986 60.5  20.3 $3,932 $78,888 6.3% 52.8% 13.2% $1,523 $844 $679
1991  814 59.4  22.0 $4,007 $94,574 14.1% 54.1% 9.5% $1,773 $984 $789
1992  1,059 59.7  22.4 $4,262 $97,160 13.4% 49.1% 12.5% $1,855 $1,034 $822
1993  973 59.5  22.7 $4,284 $102,521 14.0% 57.8% 10.6% $1,928 $1,065 $863
1994  1,575 58.9  23.5 $4,469 $110,164 15.6% 56.6% 11.1% $2,066 $1,150 $916
1995  313 58.5  21.2 $4,247 $102,851 23.3% 65.2% 9.9% $1,864 $1,025 $839
1996  537 57.9  23.0 $4,609 $120,323 24.6% 58.7% 8.8% $2,187 $1,214 $973
1997  424 56.5  23.6 $5,205 $149,493 46.0% 46.5% 11.1% $2,707 $1,515 $1,192
1998  338 55.8  23.9 $5,496 $174,017 59.5% 42.3% 16.9% $3,039 $1,667 $1,372
1999  269 55.5  24.6 $6,078 $206,041 65.8% 33.1% 11.5% $3,544 $1,923 $1,621
2000  86 54.6  24.9 $6,413 $228,500 74.4% 29.1% 8.1% $3,905 $2,128 $1,777
2001  135 54.9  24.9 $6,385 $220,348 63.0% 38.5% 11.1% $3,736 $2,019 $1,717
2002  124 55.9  24.6 $6,132 $204,709 55.6% 47.6% 16.9% $3,514 $1,897 $1,617
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Table 2.  Comparing Money’s Worth of Life Annuities available from PERS and TIAA, 1990-2002 
 
We compare the money’s worth of life annuities based on PERS’ DC benefit to the money’s worth of TIAA’s life annuities.  We assume that the retiree is 65 
years 0 months old and male.  The actuarial equivalency factor, AEF, determines the initial monthly life annuity payment per $1,000 spent to purchase the life 
annuity.  During our sample period, PERS does not adjust its AEFs, while TIAA adjusts its AEFs in January of each calendar year, to reflect changes in member 
life expectancies or the risk-free rate.  EPV is the expected present value of receiving an initial monthly life annuity payment of $1.00, beginning next month.  
The nominal value of the life annuity payments to be received from PERS is assumed to grow at 2.0% per year, whereas the nominal value of life annuity pay-
ments to be received from TIAA is assumed to be constant.  To calculate the probability that the retiree receives the life annuity payment t months from today, 
we use life tables published by the U.S. Social Security Administration for 2004.  To calculate the present value of the expected payments, we use the yield on 
the 10-Year U.S. Treasury Note at the end of the prior month.  The average annual yield is reported in column 10.  We calculate money’s worth of each life an-
nuity as the expected present value of its life annuity payments relative to its price (i.e., as (AEF times EPV) divided by $1,000).  In column (9), we calculate the 
money’s worth of the PERS life annuity relative to the money’s worth of the TIAA life annuity (that is,  equals (AEFPERS times EPV2%) divided by (AEFTIAA 
times EPV0%).  When  equals one, PERS and TIAA allow retirees to purchase the same expected present value of life annuity benefits per dollar of initial out-
lay.  Values greater than one, as observed in this table, imply that PERS sells more valuable life annuity benefits than TIAA.  The bottom row reports the pair-
wise correlation between the yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury Note and AEF, EPV, and MW.   
 
   PERS  TIAA  PERS relative to TIAA  Yield on 10-Year
Year  AEF  EPV  MW  AEF  EPV  MW  AEF  EPV    Treasury 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) = (1)/(4)  (8) = (2)/(5) (9) = (3)/(6) (10) 
1990  9.79  115.94  1.14  8.82  99.39  0.88  1.11  1.17  1.30  8.43% 
1991  9.79  119.51  1.17  8.75  102.19  0.89  1.12  1.17  1.31  8.03% 
1992  9.79  126.22  1.24  8.52  107.41  0.92  1.15  1.18  1.35  7.31% 
1993  9.79  135.81  1.33  7.72  114.84  0.89  1.27  1.18  1.50  6.39% 
1994  9.79  145.37  1.42  7.10  122.20  0.87  1.38  1.19  1.64  5.64% 
1995  9.79  123.27  1.21  7.72  105.12  0.81  1.27  1.17  1.49  7.59% 
1996  9.79  145.37  1.42  7.10  122.20  0.87  1.38  1.19  1.64  5.58% 
1997  9.79  134.68  1.32  7.34  113.97  0.84  1.33  1.18  1.58  6.50% 
1998  9.79  146.64  1.44  7.03  123.18  0.87  1.39  1.19  1.66  5.51% 
1999  9.79  157.50  1.54  6.61  131.47  0.87  1.48  1.20  1.77  4.65% 
2000  9.79  132.48  1.30  7.39  112.27  0.83  1.33  1.18  1.56  6.67% 
2001  9.79  150.57  1.47  7.08  126.18  0.89  1.38  1.19  1.65  5.18% 
2002  9.79  153.28  1.50  6.77  128.25  0.87  1.45  1.20  1.73  5.03% 
Correl.  0.000  -0.998  -0.998  0.935  -0.998  -0.028  -0.945  -0.999  -0.955  — 
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Table 3.  Percent of PERS Retirees Choosing Lump Sum Option, by Retirement Calculation Method, 1990-2002  
 
This table summarizes the demand for lump sum options across years and across retirees for whom the total life annuity benefit is calculated using DC, DB, or 
DCDB.  The sample is the same one that we summarized in Table 1.  % Lump reflects the fraction of retirees choosing the lump sum option.  MW is the money’s 
worth of the total life annuity option relative to the lump sum option.  It is defined as the expected present value of the life annuity payments under the total life 
annuity option minus those under the lump sum option, divided by the lump sum payout.  We report the median value of MW each year.   
 
   All Retirees  DC  DB  DCDB 
 Year  # Retirees  % Lump  MW  # Retirees  % Lump  MW  # Retirees  % Lump  MW  # Retirees  % Lump  MW 
1990  1,621  8.6%  $1.16  336  7.1%  $1.12  299  9.4%  $1.24  986  8.8%  $1.15 
1991  1,876  8.6%  $1.21  882  7.9%  $1.20  180  15.0%  $1.29  814  7.9%  $1.21 
1992  1,875  6.9%  $1.30  544  7.2%  $1.28  272  11.0%  $1.38  1,059  5.7%  $1.31 
1993  2,173  9.7%  $1.47  924  9.2%  $1.42  276  18.8%  $1.54  973  7.6%  $1.52 
1994  3,175  10.4%  $1.26  1,104  11.4%  $1.24  496  14.3%  $1.31  1,575  8.5%  $1.27 
1995  1,637  16.4%  $1.40  1,138  16.8%  $1.40  186  22.6%  $1.30  313  11.2%  $1.47 
1996  2,073  18.1%  $1.39  1,220  18.2%  $1.37  316  20.6%  $1.32  537  16.4%  $1.40 
1997  2,457  17.9%  $1.43  1,785  18.8%  $1.43  248  22.2%  $1.28  424  11.6%  $1.45 
1998  4,170  20.5%  $1.59  3,635  21.0%  $1.59  197  23.9%  $1.48  338  12.7%  $1.60 
1999  4,065  20.4%  $1.51  3,614  20.5%  $1.51  182  22.0%  $1.35  269  18.2%  $1.51 
2000  1,883  21.7%  $1.48  1,691  21.4%  $1.50  106  28.3%  $1.29  86  19.8%  $1.47 
2001  2,644  15.9%  $1.63  2,311  15.7%  $1.63  198  18.7%  $1.48  135  15.6%  $1.64 
2002  2,411  10.6%  $1.67  2,089  10.4%  $1.67  198  11.6%  $1.58  124  12.1%  $1.68 
Total  32,060  15.0%  $1.45  21,273  16.6%  $1.49  3,154  17.3%  $1.36  7,633  9.6%  $1.33 
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Table 4.  Predicting Average Monthly Demand for Lump Sum Option, 1990-2002  
 
We report coefficients from time-series regressions estimated via weighted least squares.  The sample consists of the 150 months between January 1990 and June 
2002.  The dependent variable is the fraction of PERS retirees who choose the lump sum option in month t.  The weight in month t is the number of retiree choic-
es used to calculate this fraction.  Independent variables include the ratio of the actuarial equivalency factor available from PERS (under the DC formula) to the 
life annuity payment available from TIAA (i.e., column (7) of Table 2), the return on the S&P 500 index over the prior 12 months, the implied volatility on the 
S&P 500 index option over the month t as measured by CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) at the end of month t-1, and the inflation-adjusted level of NASDAQ 
measured at the end of month t-1.  Variables in columns (1) through (4) are measured as levels.  Variables in column (5) are measured as first differences, which 
results in the loss of one observation.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses and calculated as in Newey and West (1987), with a lag of 24 months.  Signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***.  
 
Estimation:    Levels  Levels  Levels  Levels  1
st Differences 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
                       
Relative Generosity of PERS Life Annuity    0.268  ***  0.265  ***  0.206  ***  0.111  ***  0.322  * 
       (0.069)   (0.038)   (0.048)   (0.039)   (0.185)  
Return on S&P 500 Index over prior 12 months        0.160  ***  0.174  ***  0.144  ***  0.071  * 
        (0.042)   (0.036)   (0.028)   (0.041)  
Level of VIX index at end of prior month            0.289  **  0.100    0.119   
            (0.131)   (0.092)   (0.124)  
Inflation-adjusted level of NASDAQ index                 0.005  ***  0.001   
   at end of prior month                (0.001)   (0.002)  
Constant    -0.182   -0.195 ***  -0.180  ***  -0.073   -0.009 ** 
    (0.080)   (0.049)   (0.057)   (0.048)   (0.004)  
                       
Number of monthly observations    150    150    150    150    149   
F-Statistic    15.07  ***  37.55  ***  23.39  ***  31.64  ***  2.67  ** 
 Table 5.  Predicting Individual Demand for Lump Sum Option, 1990-2002  
 
We report marginal effects estimated via logit.  The dependent variable equals one when retiree k chooses the lump sum option, 
and zero when retiree k chooses the total life annuity option.  Columns (1), (2), and (5) focus on the full sample of retirees; col-
umn (3) is restricted to retirees who choose a single life annuity; column (4) is restricted to retirees who choose a joint life annui-
ty.  All specifications include a separate fixed effect for each year of service.  Columns (2) through (4) include a separate fixed 
effect for each year of age between 50 and 70.  Column (5) includes a separate fixed effect for each calendar year.  We include 
dummy variables indicating whether retiree k: dies 1-24 months after retirement; dies 25-48 months after retirement; is female; 
has a positive allocation to the variable investment vehicle in the PERS retirement account; is eligible for police or fire retirement 
benefits; chooses a single life annuity; is retiring before the normal retirement age (55 for police and fire; 58 for almost everyone 
else); has a pre-retirement salary in the top quarter of retirees; receives Tier 2 retirement benefits; or is old enough to collect So-
cial Security benefits (62+).  We also control for the level of the life annuity payments under the lump sum option (measured in 
December 2003 dollars), and the estimated fraction of retiree k’s career spent working with PERS employers.  Ln Money’s Worth 
is the natural logarithm of the expected present value of the incremental life annuity payments associated with choosing the total 
life annuity option over the lump sum option, divided by the lump sum payout.  Our proxies for economic conditions and investor 
sentiment include the current unemployment rate in the county of retiree k’s most recent employer, the level of the CBOE Vola-
tility Index (VIX) at the end of month t-1, the inflation-adjusted level of the NASDAQ index at the end of month t-1, the return 
on the S&P 500 index over the prior 12 months, and the return earned in the PERS retirement account over this same period.  
Standard errors are clustered on calendar month (e.g., June 2002).  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, 
**, and ***.  
 
Sample:  Full  Full  Single Life  Joint Life  Full 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Retiree Characteristics                     
   Dies 1-24 months after retirement?  0.085   *** 0.086   *** 0.177   *** 0.042   *  0.090   ***
   (0.024)     (0.024)     (0.048)     (0.022)     (0.024)    
   Dies 25-48 months after retirement?  0.014      0.016      -0.025      0.036   *  0.017     
   (0.017)     (0.017)     (0.029)     (0.021)     (0.017)    
   Female?  -0.046   *** -0.047   *** -0.082   *** -0.027   ***  -0.049   ***
   (0.007)     (0.007)     (0.011)     (0.007)     (0.008)    
   Positive allocation to variable  0.021   *** 0.020   *** 0.017   **  0.021   ***  0.019   ***
      investment vehicle?  (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.008)     (0.005)     (0.005)    
   Eligible for police or fire benefits?  -0.009      -0.021   *** -0.018      -0.022   ***  -0.020   ***
   (0.007)     (0.008)     (0.017)     (0.007)     (0.008)    
   Level of partial life annuity  0.035   *** 0.036   *** 0.052   *** 0.031   ***  0.030   ***
      ($000, Dec 2003)  (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.008)     (0.004)     (0.004)    
   Chooses single life annuity?  0.077   *** 0.077   ***             0.081   ***
   (0.005)     (0.005)                 (0.004)    
   Estimated fraction of career spent  -0.191   *** -0.733   *** -1.228   *** -0.400   ***  -0.737   ***
      Working for PERS employers  (0.067)     (0.097)     (0.156)     (0.141)     (0.093)    
   Salary at or above 75th percentile  -0.031   *** -0.032   *** -0.033   *** -0.032   ***  -0.027   ***
      (within calendar year)?  (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.010)     (0.006)     (0.005)    
   Retiring before normal retirement   0.027   *** 0.006      0.018      0.001      0.005     
      age?  (0.006)     (0.011)     (0.023)     (0.011)     (0.010)    
   Tier 2 retirement benefits?  -0.033      -0.031      -0.051      -0.017      -0.027     
   (0.027)     (0.028)     (0.034)     (0.048)     (0.027)    
   Old enough to collect Social Security  -0.038   ***                        
       benefits (62+)?  (0.007)                            
Value of Incremental Life Annuity                     
   Ln Money’s Worth  0.045   *** 0.044   *** 0.045   **  0.045   ***  0.029   ***
  (0.013)     (0.014)     (0.021)     (0.016)     (0.011)    
   Retiree Not Eligible for DCDB?  -0.016   *** -0.016   *** -0.035   *** -0.007      -0.032   ***
  (0.006)     (0.006)     (0.012)     (0.007)     (0.007)    
Economic Conditions and Investor Sentiment                  
   Local unemployment rate  -0.167      -0.174      -0.029      -0.271      -0.005     
  (0.182)     (0.182)     (0.279)     (0.176)     (0.125)      44
 
   Level of VIX at end of month t-1  0.112      0.109      0.168      0.077      0.019     
  (0.095)     (0.094)     (0.150)     (0.083)     (0.084)    
   Inflation-adjusted level of NASDAQ  0.005   *** 0.005   *** 0.006   *** 0.005   ***  0.002     
       index at end of month t-1  (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001)    
   Return on S&P 500 index  0.155   *** 0.155   *** 0.145   *** 0.164   ***  0.064     
       over prior 12 months  (0.034)     (0.034)     (0.052)     (0.030)     (0.050)    
   Return in PERS retirement account  -0.060      -0.066      -0.025      -0.096      0.017     
       over prior 12 months  (0.102)     (0.102)     (0.158)     (0.088)     (0.074)    
Years-of-Service FEs?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Age-in-Years FEs?  ---  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Calendar Year FEs?  ---  ---  ---  ---  Yes 
Sample Size  31,809  31,809  11,500  20,309  31,809 
Pseudo R
2  0.0498  0.0534  0.0634  0.0432  0.0592 
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Table 6.  Predicting Individual Demand for Lump Sum Option – Alternative Specifications  
 
We report marginal effects estimated via logit.  The dependent variable equals one when retiree k chooses the lump sum option 
and zero when the retiree chooses the total life annuity option.  Columns (1), (2), and (5) focus on the full sample of PERS retir-
ees; column (3) is restricted to retirees who are 58 years old and not eligible for police or fire benefits; column (4) is restricted to 
retirees for whom we can calculate the fraction of co-workers who chose the lump sum option in the past 12 months.  Our 

































k     
k     
k    
  
where MWTIAA is the money’s worth of the incremental life annuity available from TIAA, MWDC is the money’s worth of the 
incremental life annuity available from PERS assuming that the total and partial life annuity payments are both calculated under 
DC, and MWMax is the money’s worth of the incremental life annuity available from PERS based on the maximum total and par-
tial life annuity payments that retiree k is eligible to receive.  In column (2), we decompose  further: 
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where MWHyp. Max is the money’s worth of the incremental life annuity payments available from PERS assuming that retiree k is 
eligible for total life annuity payments calculated under DCDB.  In addition, we include dummy variables indicating whether 
retiree k is ineligible for total life annuity payments calculated under DCDB, has access to a lump sum payment in the top 10% of 
all lump sum payments during our sample period, or has access to incremental life annuity payments in the bottom 10% of all 
incremental life annuity payments during our sample period.  We also include the fraction of retiree k’s coworkers who chose the 
lump sum option in the prior 12 months (set to missing when retiree k is the only retiree from the employer in the prior 12 
months).  All other variables are defined in the notes to Table 5.  Standard errors cluster on the date of the payout choice (e.g., 
June 2002).  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and ***. 
 
Sample:  Full  Full  Age 58  Peer Choices  Full 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Retiree Characteristics                     
   Dies 1-24 months after retirement?  0.090   ***  0.090   ***  0.140   **  0.079   ***  0.089   *** 
   (0.024)     (0.024)     (0.071)     (0.025)     (0.024)    
   Dies 25-48 months after retirement?  0.017      0.017      0.037      0.005      0.019     
   (0.017)     (0.017)     (0.049)     (0.017)     (0.017)    
   Female?  -0.053   ***  -0.053   ***  -0.051   ***  -0.052   ***  -0.055   *** 
   (0.010)     (0.010)     (0.016)     (0.010)     (0.010)    
   Positive allocation to variable  0.021   ***  0.021   ***  0.007      0.023   ***  0.022   *** 
     investment vehicle?  (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.013)     (0.005)     (0.005)    
   Eligible for police or fire benefits?  -0.021   ***  -0.024   ***  -0.033      -0.022   ***  -0.016   ** 
   (0.008)     (0.008)     (0.047)     (0.008)     (0.008)    
   Level of partial life annuity  0.031   ***  0.032   ***  0.025   ***  0.033   ***  0.019   *** 
      ($000, Dec 2003)  (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.009)     (0.004)     (0.005)    
   Chooses single life annuity?  0.080   ***  0.080   ***  0.053   ***  0.078   ***  0.080   *** 
   (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.013)     (0.005)     (0.005)    
   Estimated fraction of career spent  -0.753   ***  -0.744   ***  0.563      -0.733   ***  -0.766   *** 
      working for PERS employers  (0.095)     (0.094)     (0.511)     (0.107)     (0.094)    
   Salary at or above 75th percentile  -0.028   ***  -0.028   ***  0.001      -0.028   ***  -0.026   *** 
      (within calendar year)?  (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.015)     (0.005)     (0.005)    
   Retiring before normal retirement   0.004      0.005      0.208      0.004      0.004     
      age?  (0.010)     (0.010)     (0.419)     (0.011)     (0.011)    
   Tier 2 retirement benefits?  -0.037      -0.035            -0.013      -0.039     
   (0.025)     (0.026)           (0.036)     (0.025)    
   Fraction of coworkers who chose                    0.094   ***       
       lump sum in prior 12 month                    (0.014)          
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Value of Incremental Life Annuity                     
   Ln MW of life annuity from TIAA  0.033      0.032      -0.018      0.033      0.029     
  (0.061)     (0.061)     (0.115)     (0.062)     (0.061)    
   Ln (MW DC / MW TIAA) = Ln   0.233   *** 0.232   *** 0.188   *  0.229   ***  0.232   ***
      (0.070)     (0.070)     (0.107)     (0.084)     (0.070)    
   Ln (MW Max / MW DC) = Ln   0.029   **        -0.014      0.030   **  0.027   ** 
       (0.012)           (0.055)     (0.015)     (0.011)    
   Ln (MW Hyp. Max / MW DC)         0.038   ***                  
       = Ln 1        (0.012)                      
   Ln (MW Max / MW Hyp. Max)         -0.097   **                   
       = Ln 2        (0.044)                      
   Retiree Not Eligible for DCDB?  -0.027   *** -0.032   *** -0.010      -0.021   ***  -0.028   ***
  (0.007)     (0.007)     (0.015)     (0.007)     (0.007)    
   Lump Sum in Top 10%?                          0.046   ***
                            (0.012)    
   Incremental Life Annuity Payments                           0.046   ***
      in Bottom 10%?                          (0.011)    
Economic Conditions and Investor Sentiment                  
   Local unemployment rate  -0.222      -0.222      -0.311      -0.244      -0.235     
  (0.178)     (0.179)     (0.280)     (0.183)     (0.181)    
   Level of VIX at end of month t-1  0.021      0.021      0.115      -0.029      0.024     
  (0.100)     (0.100)     (0.159)     (0.103)     (0.099)    
   Inflation-adjusted level of NASDAQ  0.004   *** 0.004   *** 0.003   *  0.004   ***  0.004   ***
       index at end of month t-1  (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.002)     (0.001)     (0.001)    
   Return on S&P 500 index  0.146   *** 0.145   *** 0.143   **  0.151   ***  0.149   ***
       over prior 12 months  (0.032)     (0.032)     (0.058)     (0.032)     (0.031)    
   Return in PERS retirement account  -0.068      -0.065      0.058      -0.073      -0.068     
       over prior 12 months  (0.091)     (0.091)     (0.166)     (0.098)     (0.090)    
Years-of-Service FEs?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Age-in-Years FEs?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size  31,809  31,809  4,254  28,762  31,809 
Pseudo R2  0.0556  0.0559  0.0574  0.0540  0.0577 
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Table A1.  Tradeoffs Between Total Life Annuity Option and Lump Sum Option 
This table summarizes tradeoffs between the total life annuity and lump sum options for retirees for whom the life annuity 
payments are calculated using different benefit formulas.  IPF is a dummy variable that indicates whether the retiree is eligi-
ble for police and fire benefits.  IDCDB is a dummy variable that indicates whether the retiree contributed into PERS by Au-
gust 1981, making her eligible for DCDB total life annuity benefits.  Panel A focuses on normal retirees (IPF=0) and Panel 
B focuses on police and fire (IPF=1). The four rows correspond to the different ways that full life annuities can be calculated 
for DCDB-eligible and DCDB-ineligible retirees, where DC is the defined contribution retirement benefit, DB is the defined 
benefit retirement benefit, and DCDB is half of the DC benefit plus more than half of the DB benefit.  xDB is defined as final 
average salary times years of service times a factor that reduces benefits when retiring before the normal retirement age.  
xDC is defined as the PERS account balance times AEFPERS.  For normal retirees, the four rows correspond to (a) xDC < 
0.00670 xDB, (b) 0.00670 xDB ≤ xDC < 0.00835 xDB, (c) 0.00835 xDB ≤ xDC < 0.01 xDB, and (d) xDC ≥ 0.01 xDB.  For police 
and fire, the four rows correspond to xDC < 0.00650 xDB, 0.00650 xDB ≤  xDC < 0.01 xDB, 0.01 xDB ≤ xDC < 0.01350 xDB, and 
xDC ≥ 0.01350 xDB.  TLA is the level of the life annuity payment associated with the total life annuity option and PLA is the 
level of the life annuity payment associated with the lump sum option.  The term  (which appears in equation (3)) 
measures the money’s worth of the forgone life annuity payments associated with choosing the lump sum option relative to 
case (d), when the total life annuity and lump sum life annuity are both calculated using DC. 
 
Panel A:  Normal Retirees (IPF  = 0) 
        
  TLA Benefit  (TLA - PLA) / TLA   
 I DCDB  = 1  IDCDB  = 0  IDCDB  = 1  IDCDB  = 0  IDCDB  = 1  IDCDB  = 0 
          
(a)  DB DB 0.401  0.401  > 1  > 1 
(b)  DCDB DB  (0.401, 0.443)  0.401 1  [0.802,  1.000] 
(c)  DCDB DC  (0.443, 0.500)  (0.401, 0.500)  1  [0.802, 1.000] 
(d)  DC DC 0.500  0.500 1  1 
 
Panel B:  Police and Fire Retirees (IPF  = 1) 
        
  TLA Benefit  (TLA - PLA) / TLA   
 I DCDB  = 1  IDCDB  = 0  IDCDB  = 1  IDCDB  = 0  IDCDB  = 1  IDCDB  = 0 
          
(a)  DB DB 0.325 0.325 >  1  >  1 
(b)  DCDB DB  (0.325, 0.426)  0.325  1  [0.650, 1.000] 
(c)  DCDB DC  (0.426, 0.500)  (0.325, 0.500)  1  [0.650, 1.000] 
(d)  DC DC 0.500 0.500 1  1 
 
 